. While a game-theoretic approach has clear advantages in modeling strategic interactions between forecast consumers (e.g., politicians) and producers (e.g., bureaucratic agencies) in a dynamic setting as depicted above, it is not only well beyond the scope of the current manuscript. 3 We utilize exponential discounting since it is standard in theoretical models of intertemporal choice because of its intuitiveness and analytical ease. In addition, this method of discounting reputation costs is logically compatible with time-consistent rational behavior (e.g., see Laibson 1997; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) . 4 The technical exposition of our model closely follows from Chiang (2000: 244-245 ).
2 agency produces a level of forecast optimism that is determined by the rate at which bureau reputation costs incurred from these forecasts, in relation to (future) policy outcomes, are exponentially discounted in present value terms.
3 The purpose of this modeling exercise is to merely demonstrate the analytical relationship between forecast horizon length, intertemporal discounting of a bureau's reputation costs, and its implications for the level of agency forecast optimism.
In our analytical model, we posit that a public agency has an incentive to commit the most (relatively) optimistic forecasts possible if they do not experience any reputation costs associated with these decisions -i.e., they will not be operating under a reputational constraint.
If we allow for the possibility that a public agency incurs nonzero reputation costs resulting from its forecasting decisions, then its decision problem can be characterized as the following constrained dynamic optimization problem 4 : the definite integral of c, Z(t), represents the intertemporal reputation cost discount factor 6 For purposes of both notational convenience and mathematical simplification, we treat t + h and t found in our manuscript document as t and 0 respectively in equations (SA-1) -(SA-6). Our theoretical results and subsequent predictions are robust to these pair of scalar-based notational transformations involving the inclusion of the h term (i.e., forecast horizon) that is adopted in our subsequent discussion of the empirical implications of the theoretical model. Consider that these respective terms are equivalent because if h = 0 (t = 0 in our manuscript document's notation), then t + h = t. If h > 0 (t > 0 in our manuscript document's notation), then t + h > t by definition. Furthermore, if h 6 4 (i.e., t 6 4 in our manuscript document's notation), likewise t + h 6 4 since t is nonnegative by definition. 5 between the current period and some future period which cannot be nonnegative by definition.
Further, because and maximizes the definite solution of the
agency's objective function whenever any c(t) path is consistent with Z(t) 6 4 as t 6 4, these values of c(t) and Z(t) will, in turn, yield and , respectively. This 7 For purposes of brevity, we do not present the general proofs of the maximum principle for this type of infinite horizon problem since they have already been established elsewhere (see Halkin 1974: 270-271) . To summarize, these proofs consist of demonstrating that (1) optimality of infinite horizon problem (IHP) implies finite horizon clamped end-point (FHCEP) optimality but not vice-versa (Halkin 1974: Theorem 4.1, 270) , and also that (2) the maximum principle holds for the IHP when FHCEP is optimal for IHP (Halkin 1974: Theorem 4.2, 270-271) . The motivation from these class of infinite horizon problems is merely an extension of those solutions developed in the mathematics of optimal control under finite time horizons (Halkin 1964; Pontriagin et al; 1962) .
Proposition 1 (Policy Forecast Horizon Proposition):
As , h → ∞ , and hence, .
( )
Proposition 1, which serves as the logical basis for H1, states that as the forecast horizon increases, the present value of exponentially discounted future reputation costs will drop, and hence, an agency's level of forecast optimism will rise, ceteris paribus. 7 Further, the relationship described above also serves as the theoretical basis for both Corollaries A & B that highlight the varying intertemporal discounting of bureau reputation costs arising from organizational stability differences discussed in the manuscript. Suppose that the present value of exponentially discounted future reputation costs associated with a public agency's forecasts are positively related to their level of organizational stability such that the discount factors for a pair of bureaus can be represented by Z(t) L and Z(t) H , where the L and H notation denotes agencies with low and high levels of organizational stability, respectively. This line of reasoning produces Corollary A to Proposition 1: 8 In both the static and dynamic organizational stability hypotheses (H2 & H3), the observed outcome appears in the forecast error for both agencies, so the relative level of forecast optimism is simply the difference in the level of the forecasts across agencies (H2) and the change in the difference in the level of the forecasts across agencies as the forecast horizon extends (H3). 
